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Turkey is currently undergoing a process of drafting a new constitution. The lack of
legitimacy of the present, 1982, constitution, which was originated from the 1980
military coup d’état, renders adoption of a new contitution necessary in the public
opinion. There are high public expectations for the new constitution in terms of
assuring democratic standards.
The process for the new constitution officially started on 19th October, 2011. In
order to carry out the task of drafting, a parliamentary committee of constitutional
reconciliation was established. The committee is composed of an equal number
(three) members from each of the four political parties sitting in the current
parliament, plus the president of the parliament who serves as the president of
the committee. According to the rules of procedure the committee itself adopted,
consensus/unanimity is required for each matter to be put into the draft constitution.
Some of the political parties, led by the governing Justice and Democratic Party
(AKP), and the (pro-Kurdish) Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), argue that the
process should lead to a totally new constitution (here in the technical/constitutional
law sense of the term), while others, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), seem to hold the view that the drafting process
should be directed toward a large scale constitutional amendment. In other words,
the majority of the current composition of the Parliament, represented by AKP,
seems to assume to itself the constituent power of a constitutional assembly, even
though this claim is dubious from the perspectivess of the CHP and MHP. Of course,
these different opinions will have some important consequences, which I will come
below.  (By the way, the current composition of the Parliament resulted from the
election of June, 2011, held for the regular term of legislative election.)
The said committee seems to now to have reached an impasse, since the
consensual/unanimous decision-making rule does not resolve the different and
apparently irreconcilable opinions of the political parties, especially on some
particular issues. Of them, the Kurdish question and some of the proposals for its
solution (such as public education in one’s mother tongue and local autonomy), and
the form of government (the AKP’s insistence on presidential or semi-presidential
system) are the most controversial. If the committee fails, the AKP will most probably
instigate its own plan to pass the new constitution. It is not very clear at this stage
if it would pursue a large scale constitutional amendment or a new constitution
in the technical sense.  The AKP argues for the latter, but in a perplexed and
an unconvincing manner. And this causes some complex questions concerning
constitutional theory, to which I will come shortly below.
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Since the political impasse is being noticed by the AKP leaders, they now make
statements that they will set in motion their Plan B, according to which they will bring
their own (new) constitutional proposals, including presidential or semi-presidential
system, to the agenda of the Parliament very soon. However, they seem to be
confused in answering one question: how will they do that, i.e. how will they adopt
the new constitution in the technical sense of the term? The assumption of the
constitution-making power in the current Parliament was not, at the beginning of the
process, so problematic given the fact that the drafting task was being performed
by the constitutional reconciliation committee and consensus was required in the
committee. This challenging matter did not bring about a serious discussion, either in
the public or in the scholarly debate.
However, if the committee fails and the AKP initiates its own plan, this will be a
cause for concern and give rise to confusion with regard to the constituent power
of the Parliament. In fact, the AKP is causing this confusion and increasing it by
some of its efforts. In this sense, the most important reason of the confusion stems
from the following: as the AKP is aware that, to argue for the adoption of a new
constitution in the technical/constitutional law sense, they must somehow argue
that the Parliament holds the constituent power. The basis for this argument for
them, however, is the amendment mechanism of the present (1982) constitution.
It is clearly seen in the statements and efforts of the AKP leaders that they will try
to get the minimum votes required for passing constitutional amendments. This is
the AKP’s confusing and unconvincing justification in asserting to adopt the new
constitution.
The amendment mechanism requires at least 330 MPs’ affirmative votes (three-
fifths majority) out of total 550 votes, and AKP has 325 votes.[1] It seems highly
possible that AKP can compromise with BDP to pass the constitutional amendments,
as their total votes are enough to do so. However, whether that would mark a
new constitution in the technical sense of the term must be carefully considered.
The CHP and MHP do not oppose using the amendment mechanism of the 1982
Constitution since they believe that what is being done is a large scale constitutional
amendment.
AKP’s reliance on the amendment mechanism of the present constitution leads to
a serious contradiction in terms of the idea of constituent power. Although the AKP
assumes the current Parliament has the constituent power, they rely on an already-
existing constitutional rule. However, the very definition of the constituent power
suggests that the constituent power does not need, (or to put better, can ignore)
any legal basis in adopting a (new) constitution. Otherwise, it will be challenged as
to whether it in fact holds the constituent power. Or to put it differently, a power,
assuming in itself the constituent power, but nevertheless trying to find a legal basis
in an already-existing (constitutional) rule will be hardly coherent and convincing in
its assumption. Therefore, the current phase of the AKP’s attempt to pass a new
constitution brings about an odd or atypical situation to the very idea of constituent
power.
The oddness of the AKP’s position, however, does not end at this point. What
is more bizarre is that AKP is inclined to ignore, in submitting their constitutional
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proposals, the eternal clauses of the present constitution (the first three articles);
they want to change or abandon them. Even though this might seem to be consistent
with their own position — namely that the current Parliament has the constituent
power — the dependence on the amendment mechanism weakens this position.
Furthermore, according to constitutional law literature and also the case-law of
the Turkish Constitutional Court, it is not possible to amend the eternal clauses by
relying on the amendment mechanism. Furthermore, according to a recent decision
by the Turkish Constitutional Court, even Article 4 of the 1982 constitution, which
determines the eternal status of the first three articles, cannot be amended. [2] Here,
therefore, arises another important challenge awaiting a credible legal argument.
In conclusion, AKP wants to make some fundamental political decisions (in
Schmittian terms) in Turkey. However, it appears that they do not know how to do
that legitimately. They, while trying to rely on one specific rule (the amendment
clause) of the present constitution, ignore other important ones (the eternal clauses).
Thus, the following questions need to be answered, both in general constitutional
theory and specifically before attempting to pass a new constitution in Turkey:
Can such a complex and bizarre attempt in Turkey in adopting a new constitution
be considered as legitimate? Considering that the constituent power does not
need any legal foundation to pass a new constitution; thus legality does not have
any role to play in the process, then how can it make sense to rely on an already
existing constitutional rule? Can the amendment clause of the 1982 constitution be
simply considered as a legitimating point in adopting the new constitution, and if
so, can it also make it legally possible to ignore the rest of the Constitution? In that
case, will this result be considered merely as an apocryphal act of sovereignty (to
quote a Schmittian term)? And will that apocryphal act of sovereignty need to be
upheld by an express public support, i.e. referendum?  If not, will that constitution be
considered as a democratic one? In passing, it is relevant to state that recently some
of the AKP leaders suggest that if they get more than 367 affirmative votes (see
footnote 2) in adopting the new constitution, it may not be put into the referendum;
and this will in line with the current constitution. Thus again, if such an end result
(the new constitution) is not sent to the referendum, will that be a new democratic
constitution? Can the simple assumption of the constituent power be enough
to adopt the new constitution? Does it not need to be supported by an express
public opinion, or is a tacit one enough?  Is there any other way to adopt a new
constitution in a relatively well-functioning democratic system out of a way which
comes about democratically and for the specific purpose of constitution-making,
i.e. by a constituent assembly established by free and equal suffrage and for the
specific purpose of constitution-making? These questions need to be considered
and answered in the process undergoing in Turkey. On the other hand, if the AKP
can accomplish its goal of passing the new constitution, do constitutional lawyers
(and political theorists) need to re-consider the concept of constituent power, or
maybe abandon or replace it with something else; Hart’s rule of recognition or some
modified version of it, maybe?
I am aware that I have not offered any answer to these questions. This is simply
because I do not have any, yet. But at the same time, it is in fact difficult to have
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answers in the middle of the constitution-making process going on in Turkey, as it is
still ambiguous what the process will turn out to be. Yet, those questions, I believe,
are worth thinking about. I wanted to share these initial questions and concerns, as
they might be interesting to the international academic world, and to get some useful
feedback.
[1] According to the amendment mechanism (Art. 175), if a constitutional amendment
is passed by three-fifths, but less than two-thirds majority (367 votes), the President
shall send it to the referendum or send it back to the Parliament for re-consideration.
If a constitutional amendment is passed in the first place, by more than two-thirds
majority, the President can either accept and signed it into law or send it to the
referendum or send it to the Parliament for re-consideration. In the first case i.e. the
adoption of a constitutional amendment by three-fifths majority, the referendum is
obligatory, whereas in the second (adoption by the two-thirds majority) it depends on
The President’s discretion. If a constitutional amendment sent back by the President
to the parliament for re-consideration is adopted again (and this time can be adopted
only) by 367 votes, this time the President shall sign it into law or can send it to the
referendum.
[2] File No: 20080/16, Decision No: 2008/116, published in the Official Gazette on
October, 22, 2008.
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